Abstract: Performance evaluation in research is more and more based on numbers of publications, citations, and impact factors. In the wake of New Public Management output control has been introduced into research governance without taking into account the conditions necessary for this kind of control to work eciently. It is argued that to evaluate research by output control is counterproductive. It induces to substitute the`taste for science' by a`taste for publication'. Instead, input control by careful selection and socialization serves as an alternative.
Introduction
Today, governments spend more time and money on evaluation and performance measurement than ever before, mainly based on output based indicators. In the wake of New Public Management approaches such as management by objectives and pay-for-performance are transferred from private companies to public service organizations, e.g. to hospitals, schools and transport services to enforce market mechanisms and raise accountability, productivity, and eciency within public service institutions. Also in universities a governance by numbers (Heintz 2008) has set in, aimed at an indirect regulation and control by quasi-market institutions and the establishment of an enterprise university (Clark 1998; Marginson/Considine 2000; Bok 2003; Willmott 2003; Khurana 2007; Donoghue 2008) .
Output indicators like citations, the number of publications in journals with a high impact factor or the amount of grants today serve as the`currency' for scholarly performance. They are applied for four intended purposes. First, they serve as basis of decisions about access to promotion or tenure. Second, they are used for the allocation of resources to universities. In some countries they serve (e.g. in Australia) or are intended to serve (e.g. in the UK) as a basis for determining research funds selectively. In many countries, such as Germany and Spain, salaries are linked to publications in high ranked journals. Increasingly, universities provide cash bonuses for publications in key journals, for example, in Australia, China, and Korea (Fuyuno/Cyranoski 2006; Franzoni/Scellato/Stephan 2010) . Third, it is assumed that heating up the competition between scholars and paying bonuses according to the number of publications in top-journals motivates scholars to do more research of higher quality. Fourth, some believe that output indicators give the public a transparent picture of scholarly activity and make universities more accountable for their use of public money. Academic rankings are intended to unlock the secrets of the world of research (Weingart 2005, 119) for journalists as well as for deans, administrators, and politicians who have no special knowledge of the eld.
New Public Management intends to introduce modern management methods into public service and research institutions. However, it disregards research in management theory, in particular in management control theory and performance measurement theory. This kind of research asks, which kind of control and performance measurement system can successfully applied to which tasks.
In this paper I apply management control theory and performance measurement theory to academic research. I will inquire, whether in this eld the necessary conditions obtain under which output control works eciently.
In the next section I give a brief introduction into management control theory dealing with the question which kinds of control exist and under which condition they are applicable. In the following sections I discuss the quality of the dierent kinds of controlprocess control, output control and input controlin academic research. I conclude, that though all kinds of control have advantages and disadvantages, output control or`governance by numbers' in academic research should be applied with utmost care. Instead, input control could serve as an alternative.
Management Control Theory
Management Control Theory distinguishes three kinds of control, output control, process control, and input control and shows on which kinds of tasks they are applicable (Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch 1996; Ouchi 1979; Turner/Makhija 2006) .
Although all organizations use a combination of these control mechanisms, two aspects are decisive for employing a certain mix of control mechanism. These aspects are: (1) the knowledge related to the measurability of outputs; and (2) the knowledge about the cause-eect relations (Thompson 1967) , the transformation process (Ouchi 1979) , or the appropriate rules to be applied. The relationships between control forms and knowledge available to the evaluator are summarized in Figure 1 .
Output control (cell 1) is useful if well-dened unambiguous output-indicators are available and can be attributed to persons or groups so that the results can be contracted. It is not necessary to specify the processes that produce the desired output. Output control relies on desired results that can be linked to the use of incentives without knowing how the result can be achieved. Therefore, output control is applied when processes or cause-eect relationships are dicult to determine, are not understood by non-experts or are varying according to external changes that are dicult to predict. This is the reason why many journalists, politicians, administrators and other external observers are keen on
Figure 1: Control modes and task characteristics adopted from Ouchi (1979) Output control (cell 1) is useful if well-defined unambiguous output-indicators are available and can be attributed to persons or groups so that the results can be contracted. It is not necessary to specify the processes that produce the desired output. Output control relies on desired results that can be linked to the use of incentives without knowing how the result can be achieved. Therefore, output control is applied when processes or cause-effect relationships are difficult to determine, are not understood by non-experts or are varying according to external changes that are difficult to predict. This is the reason why many journalists, politicians, administrators and other external observers are keen on output control.
Output indicators seem to provide easy, understandable quality data. They promise to change lack of knowledge into knowledge (Heintz 2008 Process control has it disadvantages too. It is dependent on knowledgeable and fair evaluators. It sometimes restricts researchers' ability to deal with the high level of uncertainty inherent in the research process. In such situations process control might meet with criticism due to its inexibility, rigidity and sometimes malevolence and cronyism among peers.
Input or personnel control (cell 3) builds on selection, socialization and placement of individuals (Merchant/ Van der Stede 2003, 75) . It has to be applied when the preconditions of output and process control are not given. It intends to make sure that individuals have internalized norms and professional standards so that they follow them even when there is no output or process control feasible. Input control takes place inside professional groups. Senior colleagues function as supervisors and role models for younger co-workers in the process of selection, socialization and placement. After a candidate has passed the input control he or she becomes the member of a profession. Output and process control loses importance. Autonomy is curtailed only by professional norms that are conrmed by institutionalized rituals. According to Ouchi (1979) , input control should be applied with complex and ambiguous tasks.
2 This is the case not only with researchers, but also with professions characterized by a low degree of observable outputs and processes, such as life-tenured judges (e.g., Benz/Frey 2007; Posner 2010 ) and executive search companies (Zehnder 2001) . However, input control has a major disadvantage: It is in danger of being submitted to groupthink (Janis 1972 ) and cronyism.
Output and/or process control (cell 4) is not relevant because it is quite clear that activities that can be controlled by outputs and/or well dened processes characterize simple tasks apart from research.
To summarize, Management Control Theory claries when to apply output, process, or input control and when to avoid it.
3 In reality, there is always a mix of these types of control. Depending on the type of the task and the knowledge of the evaluator about the task an optimal mix of control types should be aimed for. In the next sections I will discuss to which extent the criteria for the dierent kinds of control are met in research.
The Quality of Process Control in Research
Process control in the form of peer control is the basis of all other kinds of control in academic researchbe it output or input control. Research is characterized by a cumulative process of knowledge building, by a great uncertainty of research outcomes, and by an even greater uncertainty whether the research results will be ever marketable. In addition, research often produces serendipity eects; that is, it provides answers to unasked questions (Stephan 1996; Simon- 2 Ouchi (1979) calls this kind of control clan control. 3 Many authors (Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch 1996; Ouchi 1979 ton 2004). Therefore in academia evaluation by the market has to be replaced by peer evaluation to determine whether a piece of research represents an advance. Only peers are able to evaluate on the one hand the degree of novelty of a research result and on the other hand who earns the reputation to be the discoverer according to the priority rule (Merton 1973; Dasgupta/David 1994) .
The decision about priority often is a matter of controversial scholarly discussion (Merton 1961) .
The preconditions of a high quality process control are that peers are well in- First, the extent to which reviewing reports conform to each other is low.
The correlation between the judgments of two peers falls between 0.09 and 0.5 (Starbuck 2005) . In clinical neuroscience, it was found that the correlations among reviewers' recommendations was little greater than would be expected by chance alone (Rothwell/Martyn 2000 , 1964 . It is important that the correlation is higher for papers rejected than for papers accepted (Cichetti 1991) . This means that peer reviewers are better able to identify academic low performers than excellent research (Moed 2007) .
Second the correlation of a particular reviewer's evaluation with the actual quality as measured by later citations of the manuscript reviewed is also quite low between 0.25 and 0.30 (Starbuck 2006, 8384) .
Third, many rejections of papers in highly ranked journals are documented that later were awarded high prizes, including the Nobel Prize (Gans/Shepherd 1994; Campanario 1996; Lawrence 2003) . (non-refereed) special issue of the journal Social Text, which was written as a parody. The editors did not realize that the bogus article was a hoax (Sokal 1996) . Seventh, it is sometimes not in the interest of rational and selsh reviewers to accept a piece of research or to give advice how to improve it. Reviewers might reject papers that threaten their previous work (Lawrence 2003) or draw attention to competing ideas. In a simulation it was shown that unless the frac- As a consequence, the quality and credibility of process control in research is far from being unquestioned. In particular in situations of radical innovations or paradigm shifts (Kuhn 1962) 5 In addition, it is expected that some of the problems of peer reviews can be avoided.
The Quality of Output Control in Research
Output control in research measures citations, the amount of publications in refereed journals or the amount of grants. These numbers are the basis of rankings or ratings. However, output control in research is based on process control in the form of peer evaluations. Process control by peers is turned into output control by disembedding it from its multifaceted context that peers consider, by crystallizing it into indicators and by aggregating them into numbers and rankings that are understandable by non-experts (Heintz 2008) . In order to estimate to which extent these numbers are able to measure research quality and to give non-experts a transparent picture of scholarly activity I will proceed in three steps. First, I consider the advantages of rankings compared to peer reviews on which they are based. Second, I will ask to which extent the aggregation of peer judgments in the form of rankings is correct. Third, I will discuss behavioural eects of output control as they are discussed in the performance measurement literature and I will apply these insights to the measurement of research performance. Fourth, I will ask to which extent output measures could be used to determine a strategy to produce a desired output in the future. The aim is to examine whether output control in research meets the four conditions mentioned for this kind of control, namely rst to be a precise measure of performance, sec-5 For example, the British Government decided to replace its Research Assessment Exercise based mainly on qualitative evaluations with a system based mainly on bibliometrics. Interestingly, the Australian Government, which used mostly bibliometrics in the past, in the future plans to strengthen qualitative peer review methods (Donovan 2007). ond, to be clear cut and stable, third, to motivate people in an ecient way and fourth to help allocate resources eciently.
Which are the advantages of output control compared to process control in research?
Although in research rankings are based on process control in the form of peer evaluation they have several advantages that help explain why they have become so popular in the last years (e.g. Abramo et al. 2009 ).
First, rankings are based on more than the three or four evaluations typical for qualitative approaches. Through statistical aggregation, individual reviewers' biases may be balanced. Second, the inuence of the old boys' network may be avoided. An instrument is provided to dismantle unfounded claims to fame (Khurana 2007, 337) . Third rankings facilitate the comparison between a large numbers of scholars or institutions. They admit updates and rapid intertemporal comparisons. Fourth they are intended to give research administrators, politicians, journalists, and students an easy to use device to evaluate the standing of the research.
These advantages hold only, if the process of aggregation of peer review judgments is correct and the picture of research performance given to the public is adequate.
Does the aggregation of peer judgments provide a correct picture of research performance?
In recent times, it became clear that rankings might counterbalance some problems of qualitative peer reviews but that they have disadvantages of their own Technical and methodological problems can be mitigated. What cannot be mitigated is the problem of one-dimensionality of all kinds rankings (Fase 2007) .
They press the multifacetness and ambiguity of scholarly endeavours into a simple one-dimensional order that leads the public astray. Accountability to the public should encompass the eort to make clear that there are fundamental dierences between rankings e.g. in a football league and scholarly work. A one-dimensional approach contradicts the idea of research as institutionalized scepticism (Merton 1973 ) that builds on controversial scholarly disputes. Moreover, one-dimensional rankings motivate to invest in the rst place in improving ones position in the rankings rather than in improving the performance that is intended.
In summary, the rst precondition of output control, namely that output In academia, examples of such strategic behavior can be found, for example, as`slicing strategy', whereby scholars divide their research into as many papers as possible to increase their publication list (Butler 2003) . Another example of goal displacement is the lowering of standards for PhD candidates when the amount of completed PhDs is used as a measure in rankings.
One step further go counterstrategies that consist in altering research behavior itself. Examples are scholars that distort their results to please, or at least not to oppose, prospective referees. Bedeian (2003) nds evidence that no less than 25 percent of authors revise their manuscripts according to the suggestions of the referee although they know that the change is incorrect. Frey (2003) calls this behavior academic prostitution. Authors cite possible reviewers because the latter are prone to judge papers more favorably that approvingly cite their work.
To meet the expectations of their peersmany of whom consist of mainstream scholarsauthors may be discouraged from conducting and submitting creative and unorthodox research (Horrobin 1996; Prichard/Willmott 1997; Armstrong 1997; Gillies 2008 ).
The negative eects of the`performance paradox' are enforced if a second kind of unintended consequences takes place, the decrease of intrinsically moti-6 Locke and Latham (2009) in a rejoinder provide counterevidence to Ordonez et al. 2009 .
However, they disregard that output control might well work for simple but not for complex tasks within an organization.
vated curiosity which generally is acknowledged to be of decisive importance in academic research (Amabile 1996; Spangenberg et al. 1990; Stephan 1996) .
In psychology and psychological economics, there exists considerable empirical evidence that there is a crowding-out eect of intrinsic motivation by externally imposed goals linked to incentives that do not give a supportive feedback and are perceived to be controlling 7 (Hennessey/Amabile 1998; Frey 1992; Gagné/Deci 2005; Falk/Kosfeld 2006; Ordonez et al. 2009 ).
From that point of view, output control tends to crowd out intrinsically motivated curiosity. First, in contrast to process control, rankings do not give a supportive feedback as they do not tell scholars how to improve their research.
Second, because rankings are mostly imposed from outside, the content of research is in danger of losing importance. The taste for science (Merton 1973; Dasgupta/David 1994 ) is substituted by a`taste for publication'. As a consequence, the dysfunctional reactions of scholars (e.g., goal displacement and counterstrategies) are enforced because they are not constrained by intrinsic preferences. The inducement to`game the system' in an instrumental way may get the upper hand.
To sum up the answers to the question about the behavioral reactions to output control: It has been shown that also the second and the third precondition of ecient output control in research has to be put into question. That is the existence of clear-cut and stable output criteria, and the promise that researchers are motivated in a way that possible performance increases exceed unintended side eects.
Can output measurements be used as basis for ecient resource allocation?
As mentioned, output indicators like academic rankings are used to allocate resources be it in the form of budgeting or of competitive grants. It is overlooked that it is problematic to derive forward oriented strategies from backward oriented data. The actors and organizations do not know and control their production function that transforms eorts into results in the future. In particular also in research there is a decreasing marginal eect of additional research resources (Jansen et al. 2007 ). This means, that providing more resources to high-performing researchers or research groups according to their past output might create inecient`research empires' due to a decreasing marginal productivity.
There are numerous approaches to combine backward oriented performance indicators with forward oriented strategic planning (e.g. Schreyögg/Steinmann 1987; Simons 1995; Meyer 2009 ). They dier in some respect. But they conform with the following ideas. First, backward oriented numbers are an important, but by far not the only basis for strategic resource allocation. Second, if such numbers are used, they should serve to foster exploration and learning. They should inspire discussion and mutual consultation. For this purpose one should abstain to use them as pay-for-performance incentives. Third, there must be an ongoing control of premises of strategic planning. This has to be done in an in-7 A third precondition is social relatedness, see Gagne/Deci 2005. teractive way in which the researchers themselves (and not only administrators)
should have a say.
To summarize the ndings about the four preconditions that must be fullled for an ecient output control: I conclude that this kind of control should be applied in research with utmost care. It should be used only either in an exploratory way or as a complement to peer reviews in the form of so-called informed peer review'. However, this constrains the use of output measures as a handy instrument for non-experts so assess scholarly performance.
The Quality of Input Control in Research
If neither output control nor process control work suciently well, then input control has to be applied (Ouchi 1979 ). The aim is to make candidates members of a community in which aligned norms and values are internalized and are part of their intrinsic motivation. If input control is successful, mutual tolerance for ambiguity is possible, which is important when output and process control is questionable.
What does input control mean in the case of research governance? Aspiring scholars should be carefully socialized and selected by peers to prove that they have mastered the state of the art, have preferences according to the taste for science (Merton 1973) , and are able to direct themselves. Those passing a rigorous input control should be given much autonomy to foster their creativity and intrinsic motivated curiosity. This includes the provision of basic funds to provide a certain degree of independence after having passed the entrance barriers (Gillies 2008; Horrobin 1996) .
Input control is part of the Principles Governing Research at Harvard, which states: The primary means for controlling the quality of scholarly activities of this Faculty is through the rigorous academic standards applied in selecting its members.
8 Input control has empirically proven to be successful also in R&D organizations of industrial companies (Abernethy/Brownell 1997) . This is in accordance with empirical ndings in psychological economics. They show that on average intrinsically motivated people do not shirk when they are given autonomy (Frey 1992; Gneezy/Rustichini 2000; Fong/Tosi 2007) . Instead, they raise their eorts when they perceive that they are trusted ( cation process. Fourth, input control is a kind of`informed peer review' that is able to use output indicators in an exploratory way.
The disadvantages consist rst in the danger that some scholars who have passed the selection might misuse their autonomy, reduce their work eort, and waste their funds. This disadvantage will be lower when the selection process is conducted rigorously.
Second, input control is in danger of being submitted to groupthink (Janis 1972 ) and cronyism. This danger can be mitigated by fostering the diversity of scholarly approaches within the relevant peer group.
Third, the public as well as university administrators do not get an easy to comprehend picture of scholarly activities as it is intended with output control based on rankings. People outside the scholarly community have to accept that to evaluate scholarly activities there is no easy to understand criteria comparable to rankings of football leagues. As a consequence, universities leaders like presidents, vice chancellors and deans should consist of accomplished scholars.
In contrast to pure managers top scholars have a better understanding of the research process. Goodall (2009) shows for a panel of 55 research universities that a university´s research performance is improved after an accomplished scholar has been hired as president.
To compensate for the disadvantages of input control, periodic self-evaluation including external evaluators should be applied. The major goal is to induce selfreection and feedback among the members of a research unit.
Conclusioǹ
Governance by numbers' as applied by New Public Management to research activities comes at a high cost. Though all kinds of control have advantages and disadvantages, I have argued that in research input control is the most adequate form of control. Input control includes elements of output control as well as of process control during a thorough selection and socialization process conducted in the form of`informed peer reviews'. The disadvantages of output and process control mentioned with input control are limited for several reasons.
First, input control takes place in few situations only. Second, input control still leaves open much heterogeneity of dierent scholarly views. Third, it helps scholars internalize professional norms and standards during their socialization process to a high degree, so that they can be granted much autonomy and are able to participate in the highly controversial and ambiguous debate that is at the heart of scholarly activity. The price to pay is that the public does not get an easy to comprehend picture of scholarly activity. But it should be part of the accountability of research and research administration to the public to communicate that scholarly work has to be evaluated in a dierent way than football games or hit parades.
